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COMMENT
THE VIRTUES AND VICES OF A
JUDGE: AN ARISTOTELIAN GUIDE
TO JUDICIAL SELECTION
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM*
INTRODUCTION
A core insight of the legal realists was that many disputes are inde-
terminate.1 For example, in many appellate adjudications, respectable
legal arguments can be made for both sides of the dispute. A contempo-
rary reaction to the realist insight by critical legal scholars is expressed in
the slogan "Law is politics." This critical slogan might be elaborated as
follows: in openly political activities, such as the legislative process or
partisan elections, debate centers on issues of value and social vision that
are outside the scope of "legal reasoning." Judicial opinions merely dress
up political decisions in the garb of legal reasoning.
The realist insight and critical reaction challenge conventional
notions about the selection of appellate judges on the basis of merit-a
combination of legal expertise and judicial temperament.2 If appellate
judges really render decisions on the basis of politics, then why should
judges be selected (or elected) on the basis of merit? In his essay, Judging
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. B.A. 1981, University of
California at Los Angeles; J.D. 1984, Harvard Law School. I owe thanks to Ken Anderson, Bob
Benson, Don Brosnan, and Nancy C. Brown for comments on earlier versions of this essay.
1. See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 27-31 (1930); Bingham, My Philosophy of
Law in My PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN LEGAL SCHOLARS 5 (1941);
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. Rnv. 431 (1930).
2. There is a vast amount of literature devoted to the conventional notion of "merit selec-
tion." See, eg., Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Affirmative Action and
Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 66 JUDICATURE 165 (1983); Vandenberg,
Voluntary Merit Selection: Its History and Current Status, 66 JUDICATURE 265 (1983); Winters, The
Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure: Its Historical Development, 7 DUQ. L. REv. 63 (1968).
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in a Corner of the Law,3 Professor Schauer has gone so far as to suggest
that appellate judges need not be lawyers and certainly need not be
experienced or excellent lawyers. Moreover, Schauer maintains, the
skills and knowledge desirable in appellate judges are not even taught in
law schools.4
Why is Schauer's proposal so novel? Why do we find seemingly
absurd the idea that lay people could be excellent judges in general and
excellent appellate judges in particular? Why does one want to say that
appellate judges, especially Justices of the United States Supreme Court,
should not only be experienced in the law, but should be drawn from the
ranks of our best and most experienced judges and lawyers? Why does
Schauer himself feel constrained to make his suggestions only half
seriously?
These questions reflect, I think, a strong intuitive discomfort with
Schauer's suggestions. Indeed, we may be tempted to underestimate the
importance of his suggestions or engage in facile refutation of his argu-
ments. These responses would be grave errors.
First, we must resist translating our strong intuitive discomfort with
Schauer's suggestions into a belief that they are not worth serious consid-
eration. Key elements of Schauer's suggestion are widely reflected in the
actual practice of judicial selection. The University of Southern Califor-
nia Law Center Symposium on Judicial Election, Selection, and
Accountability was prompted, at least in part, by the injection of partisan
politics into judicial elections. Judges in this country are selected on the
basis of politics,' and they have often been politicians or the cronies of
politicians. Vermont's superior courts include lay judges.6 Other legal
cultures have adopted some of Schauer's seemingly radical suggestions.
For example, in Nicaragua, lay people constitute special courts which try
overtly political crimes.7 In England, lay magistrates have jurisdiction
over some imprisonable offenses.' Moreover, the historical roots of the
common law tradition lie in a system in which judges were openly the
3. Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REy. 1717 (1988).
4. Id. at 1732.
5. See Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
6. See N. Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, § A, at 24 col. 2.
7. These people's courts were established by decree in 1983; the judges are Sandinista party
activists. The activity of these tribunals has recently been suspended by President Ortega as a part of
ongoing efforts to comply with the Arias Peace Plan. L.A. Times, Jan. 14, 1988, at I, p. 14, col. 1;
see also Benson, Was Nicaraguan Tribunal a Kangaroo Court? Nonsense, L.A. Times, Nov. 18,
1986, at II, p. 5, col. 1.
8. England's lay magistrate system dates back to 1361. Today's English lay magistrates are
required to take 40 hours of instruction. They have jurisdiction over criminal cases in which the
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political agents of the sovereign.9 Perhaps the most celebrated advocate
of Schauer's suggestion was James I; the King's suggestion that his rea-
son qualified him for the task of judging prompted Sir Edward Coke's
rejoinder that only lawyers were skilled in the "artificial reason and judg-
ment of the law."10
Second, we must resist overly idealistic assumptions about appellate
judging. Judges, even Supreme Court Justices, are not Ronald Dwor-
kin's Hercules.11 Judges are real men and women doing a job with lim-
ited time and ability. If our intuitive discomfort with Schauer's
suggestion is defensible, the argument must rest on an account of what
judges actually do and are realistically capable of doing.
Schauer challenges us to explain our discomfort with the idea that
nonlawyers could be good appellate judges. He tells us that familiar
explanations will no longer do. We can no longer rely on the conven-
tional notion that appellate judges must be selected on merit because only
technical knowledge of the law is required to recognize (or discover) the
legally correct solution to the questions judges usually face.
I take issue with Schauer's contention that a sophisticated under-
standing of the indeterminacy of appellate decisionmaking undermines
old-fashioned notions that we should select appellate judges on the basis
of experience and excellence in the practice of law. I will argue that
judging in the special corner of the law reserved for appellate courts
requires special intellectual and moral virtues that are best developed by
immersion in the practice of law. I will discuss Schauer's suggestion that
nonlawyers be selected for appellate judgeships as a focus for analysis,
but my conclusions will be broader. The reasons for preferring lawyers
to lay persons as appellate adjudicators will be the reasons for preferring
experienced lawyers over novices and excellent lawyers over mediocre
ones.
My argument will begin in Part I with a brief exploration of the idea
that a good judge must possess judicial virtue. This account will relate
my view of judging to the tradition of Aristotelian moral and political
potential penalties include a year's imprisonment or $2,200.00 in fines. Lay magistrates handle over
two million cases a year. L.A. Daily Journal, Mar. 13, 1985 at 4, col. 4.
9. See J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 15-16 (2d ed. 1979)
(describing early royal courts as composed of advisers and courtiers to the king); T. PLUCKNETr, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 104 (5th ed. 1956) (indicating that many early traveling
royal judges were not professional lawyers).
10. Prohibitions Del Roy, 12 Coke Rep. 63, 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (1608).
11. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 264 (1987); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105
(1978).
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theory. Part II will sketch the distinctive intellectual and moral virtues
required for excellence in judging. To be a good appellate judge, one
must possess at least three virtues: a faculty for theoretical understand-
ing of the law, a concern for the integrity of the law, and a practical
ability to choose wisely in particular circumstances. In Part III, I will
argue that the judicial virtues can, for the most part, only be acquired
through participation in the practice of law. My conclusion directly fol-
lows: appellate judges should be selected on the basis of merit under-
stood as the possession of these judicial virtues.
I. THE ROLE OF THE VIRTUES IN JUDGING
My mention of virtue may sound almost quaint to some sophisti-
cated readers. The brands of modern moral philosophy that dominate
contemporary jurisprudence are more likely to emphasize moral rules,
rights, or consequences than virtues. I do not want to deny that conse-
quentialist or deontological theories of morality can contribute impor-
tantly to our understanding of morality,' 2 but I do want to emphasize the
value of a virtue-centered account of morality in enabling us to under-
stand judicial selection. My claim is that it is precisely by examining
judicial virtue that we can understand our intuitions about what makes
for a good judge.'3 Before I redeem this claim by offering an account of
the specific virtues that make for good judging in Part II of this Essay, I
will briefly explicate Aristotle's theory of the virtues and relate that the-
ory to the practice of judging.
In recent years, there has been a revival of interest in Aristotelian
moral theory, and especially in Aristotle's theory of the virtues.14 For
Aristotle, the virtues are acquired dispositional qualities' 5-they are
12. Indeed, later in this essay I rely on such theories when I discuss the notion of the rule of
law and its specific requirement that the law be public. See infra text accompanying notes 42-43.
13. This essay starts with the intuitions about judicial selection that are taken for granted in
ordinary discourse about good and bad judging. This method falls within the broadly Aristotelian
and Wittgensteinian approach to moral philosophy represented by such diverse contemporary
figures as Elizabeth Anscombe, Phillippa Foot, and John Rawls.
14. See, ag., P. FooT, VIRTUES AND VICES (1978); P. GEACH, THE VIRTUES (1978); A.
MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984). This development is in part traceable to Elizabeth
Anscombe's essay, Modem Moral Philosophy. "Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy in ETHICS
(1968).
15. See W. HARDIE, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THEORY 107-08 (2d ed. 1980).
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potentialities or powers which are states of character or of mind. 6 Aris-
totle characterizes the virtues as intellectual or moral,17 and his views
can be sketched by examining these two categories.
The moral virtues are states of character concerned with choice;
examples include courage, temperance and justice. 18 Aristotle thought
that each of the moral virtues could be seen as the mean between two
opposing vices: thus, courage is a mean between the vices of timidity and
recklessness. 19 Moral virtues, says Aristotle, are acquired as a result of
habit; one must act courageously in order to become courageous.2 °
The intellectual virtues are practical and theoretical wisdom. Prac-
tical wisdom or phronesis is excellence in deliberation: the person of
practical reason is able to choose good ends and the means to achieve
those ends.21 Practical wisdom operates in the realm ofpraxis: action in
particular situations. Theoretical wisdom or sophia, on the other hand,
operates in the realm of theoria; abstract thinking, science and theory.22
A person begins to acquire the intellectual virtues through education;
these virtues mature through experience.23
The virtues, then, are those characteristics of mind and will that are
conducive to a good life-for Aristotle a life of happiness or faring well
and doing well. For example, the person who possesses the virtues of
temperance, courage, and wisdom will likely flourish, as will a society
composed of such persons. But the person who possesses the corre-
sponding vices of intemperance, cowardice, and stupidity will likely not
be happy and will not contribute to the happiness of others.
Finally, a word about the distinctive nature of the virtue-centered
account of morality and its relationship with a theory of judicial selec-
tion. Aristotle's theory focuses on states of character and mind. In con-
trast, a consequentialist theory like utilitarianism and a deontological
theory like Kant's categorical imperative each focus on rules for decision.
16. Id. at 99. I am inclined towards the view that such states are at bottom not only states of
the mind, but states of the brain. My approach to this issue would be within the camp in philosophy
of mind camp that is self-identified as "functionalist." See generally P. SMrrH & 0. JONES, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (1986); D. ARMSTRONG, A MATERIALIST PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND
(1968).
17. ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1751 (J.
Barnes ed. 1984) [hereinafter EN].
18. See V. HARDIE, supra note 15, at 116.
19. ENsupra note 17, at 1115a 6-7; W. HARDIn, supra note 15, at 118.
20. EN, supra note 17, at 1103a 14; see also W. HARDIE, supra note 15, at 99-100.
21. EN, supra note 17, at 1140a 25-28.
22. W. HARDIE, supra note 15, at 116.
23. EN, supra note 17, at 1103a 14; see also W. HARDIE, supra note 15, at 99-100.
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For example, the utilitarian rule is maximize utility, and Kant's rule is
act so that the maxim of your action could be willed as a universal law of
nature. Likewise, a theory of appellate judging could provide a decision
procedure for good judging: decide appeals in accord with the original
intentions of the framers or decide appeals so as to achieve efficient out-
comes. Judicial selection might be a matter of selecting judges who
adhere to the correct decision procedure. My suggestion is that a virtue-
centered theory will provide more fruitful insights into our intuitions
about what makes for a good judge. In the next Part, I consider the
specific virtues that are conducive to good judging.
II. A SKETCH OF THE JUDICIAL VIRTUES
In this section, I discuss three aspects of judicial virtue.24 The first
of these virtues is judicial intelligence--excellence in understanding and
theorizing about the law.25 The second virtue is judicial integrity: the
good judge must have a special concern for fidelity to law and for the
coherence of law. The third virtue is judicial wisdom: the good judge
must possess practical wisdom in the choosing of legal ends and means.26
The first and third are what Aristotle called intellectual virtues; the sec-
ond is what Aristotle might have called a moral virtue.
There is a fourth aspect of judicial virtue that I will not discuss in
detail: the virtue of justice. Clearly, a good judge must be just. Some-
times justice consists in applying the legal rules: my discussion of judi-
cial intelligence and integrity will elaborate on this aspect of justice.
Sometimes justice consists in departure from the legal rules: my discus-
sion of judicial wisdom will touch on this topic. Schauer's essay, how-
ever, poses the question whether the virtue of justice is a virtue that must
or should be developed through the practice of law. I believe that an
understanding of that question is best approached by first considering the
role of judicial intelligence, integrity, and wisdom.
24. I do not mean to imply that these three judicial virtues are the only character traits rele-
vant to good judging. Other virtues are clearly relevant to excellence in judging. For example, a
good judge should be courageous, willing to render the right decision even at the risk of public scorn.
Likewise, the traditional concern in judicial selection with judicial temperament is illuminated by
Aristotle's account of the virtue of good temper or praotes. EN supra note 17, at 1 25b 27-31. I
focus on judicial intelligence, integrity, and wisdom because these virtues are most clearly connected
to the practice of law in the sense developed in Part III of this essay.
25. Judicial intelligence is analogous to Aristotle's theoretical wisdom or sophia.
26. Judicial wisdom is analogous to Aristotle's practical wisdom orphronesis.
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A. JUDICIAL INTELLIGENCE
The realists observed that in many legal disputes, especially disputes
that are adjudicated or appealed, the results are not determined by the
law. Frequently, very attractive legal arguments exist on both sides of a
dispute. In such cases, the realists urged judges to decide on the basis of
policy considerations. Schauer builds on this realist observation. Citing
the law and economics literature on the selection of cases by litigants for
formal adjudication and appeal, Schauer argues that almost all the cases
presented to appellate judges will be indeterminate. As a result, the cases
will be decided on the basis of nonlegal factors, such as morals, politics,
efficiency, and so forth. Appellate judges, therefore, need not be experts
in the law. Perhaps they should be politically accountable; perhaps they
should be trained in public policy science, economics or moral philoso-
phy, but they need not be trained in law. Schauer, like James I, believes
that judging does not require "the artificial reason of the law."
In a sense, this is Schauer's strongest argument. If appellate cases
do not turn on what the law is, then it follows that appellate judges do
not need to possess special intellectual virtue in the law. I will challenge
Schauer's argument at several levels. The first challenge is to the conten-
tion that appellate courts face exclusively, or even primarily, "hard"
cases. The second challenge is more serious: even in indeterminate cases,
a correct decision may require substantial legal expertise. The third chal-
lenge reveals a crucial problem with the argument: some cases are per-
ceived as indeterminate not because the law is indeterminate, but because
the case itself is complex. The upshot of these three challenges is that
good appellate judges must possess legal intellectual virtues; they must
have the ability "to think like a lawyer" which is acquired through legal
education and participation in the practice of law.
1. Judicial Intelligence is Required in Easy Cases
Is it really true that only cases in which the law is indeterminate will
be adjudicated? It is certainly true that appellate cases are to some extent
selected for indeterminacy.27 This point is, however, easily exaggerated.
Even appellate courts decide easy cases, and easy cases do require knowl-
edge and reasoning skills that are developed through the practice of law.
27. See Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
462, 496-97 (1987).
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a. Appellate courts frequently decide easy cases: This point can be
demonstrated both empirically and through the application of rational
choice theory to litigation behavior. A brief survey of the arguments
follows.
i. Empirical evidence: Many litigated cases, even appellate cases,
are relatively determinate. There is considerable evidence that appellate
courts, even the United States Supreme Court, decide a large number of
easy cases. For example, a very large percentage of cases decided by the
United States Court of Appeals is disposed by unanimous unpublished
memoranda. One of the criteria for memorandum disposition is that the
decision not resolve a previously "indeterminate" legal question.28
Even more striking is the caseload of the United States Supreme
Court, which is usually assumed to consist entirely of hard cases. The
Supreme Court, however, decides an enormous number of easy cases.
Consider the actual disposition of cases by the Court.29 During last
term, the Court had 4,339 cases on its docket. Only 175 of these cases
resulted in written opinions, and 102 of these were decided by per curiam
or memorandum decisions. The thesis that the Court is presented only
with hard cases finds its strongest support in the large number of 5-4
decisions by the Court; there were 45 last term. Surely these are hard
cases. More troubling for this thesis is the only marginally smaller
number of unanimous decisions. Last term 18.4% of the cases with full
opinions were unanimous decisions, and 92.2% of the Court's memoran-
dum orders were made without dissent or concurrence. While, these
unanimous opinions raise a question whether all the Supreme Court's
cases are hard, it may well be that these unanimous decisions reflect
political or moral consensus on the Court about cases in which the law is
indeterminate. So far, the Supreme Court/hard case thesis seems to be in
good shape.
Similarly, the large number of cases in which certiorari was denied
does not pose an insurmountable problem for the thesis. A denial of
certiorari does not constitute a decision on the merits and hence may
simply indicate that the Supreme Court was not interested in what was
28. Cf. R. 9th Cir. Ct. App. 21(b) (requiring published opinions in cases in which the disposi-
tion "[e]stablishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule of law"); Annual Report of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts in Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 105 (1986) (Table S-5) (Of 18,199 appeals to the various circuits of
the United States Court of Appeals, 7,991 resulted in written and signed opinions).
29. All statistics are from the tables compiled in The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Leading
Cases, 101 HARV. L. Rav. 119, 362-70 (1987).
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actually a hard case. It is at least possible that this was the case in all but
a handful of the many hundreds of cases in which certiorari was denied.
Dismissal of a case brought under the appellate jurisdiction for want of a
substantial federal question is, however, a decision on the merits and is in
fact a decision that the case was "determined" by existing law.30 The
hundreds of cases which are disposed of in this way pose a very thorny
problem for the thesis that the Supreme Court does not face easy cases.
There is one line of defense: it is often charged that the Court dismisses
for want of a federal question in a case where a thorny question of federal
law simply does not interest the Court.31 It is possible that the Court
deliberately thwarts the law in almost all of the hundreds of cases in
which it dismisses an appeal, but at this point the theory that the Court
faces only hard cases seems to be a degenerating research program, as
more and more ad hoc explanations are added to refute the seemingly
contrary data.
My conclusion is that the empirical evidence provides strong sup-
port for the conclusion that appellate courts confront a significant
number of cases in which the results are relatively determined by existing
law.
Ii. Rational choice theory: Schauer, however, did not rely on
empirical evidence. The primary support for his contention was found in
literature which suggests that litigants settle cases in which law is deter-
minate, and only indeterminate cases proceed to the appellate level.
Most prominent in this literature is the work of George Priest and Benja-
min Klein, who argue that the process of selecting cases for litigation will
result in a plaintiff success rate that approaches fifty percent, irrespective
of the favorability of the substantive law to plaintiffs or defendants. 32
Schauer elaborates on the Priest and Klein model of the process and con-
cludes that almost all the appellate cases will be legally indeterminate.
33
30. Appeal is available for review of both state and lower federal courts. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1252-55 (1981). The rule that an appeal may be dismissed for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion has been developed by the Supreme Court. See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y v. Brown, 187 U.S. 308 (1902); Richardson v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 169
U.S. 128 (1898); New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks, 142 U.S. 79 (1891); see generally Ulman
& Spears, "Dismissed for Want of a Substantial Federal Question," 20 B.U.L. REV. 501 (1940).
31. Cf. Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44
HARV. L. REv. 1, 12-14 (1930) (suggesting that the Court is swayed by the "substantiality" of the
questions raised).
32. Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5-6 (1984).
33. Schauer, supra note 3, at 1723-25. Schauer cannot mean to rely on the Priest and Klein
model as it was presented in their 1984 article because that model assumes that all cases are com-
pletely determined by the law. Priest & Klein, supra note 32, at 8. Schauer's extension of the model
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As a matter of rational choice theory, this conclusion is questiona-
ble. It is based on a model of the appellate process which includes a
number of simplifying, but, highly questionable, assumptions. Let me
mention in passing a tension between Schauer's rational choice argument
and his conclusions: if incentives to settle ensure that only legally inde-
terminate cases are appealed when the decisionmakers use legal criteria
for decision, it would follow that only morally (or politically or economi-
cally) indeterminate cases will be appealed when lay judges use moral (or
political or economic) criteria for decisionmaking. 34 I will leave some of
the more detailed criticisms to a footnote35 and briefly survey some of the
more important difficulties with Schauer's argument.
Initially, litigation decisionmakers may have preferences which can-
not be accommodated in settlement before appeal. The Priest and Klein
model, which is limited to personal injury disputes, explicitly assumes
that the determinants of settlement are solely economic. 36 This assump-
tion is dubious outside the personal injury context. For example, some
would modify the assumption that there is a decision standard (Y* in the model) that divides all
disputes into a set of plaintiff's verdicts and a set of defendant's verdicts. Schauer might assume that
there is a third set of cases in which the decision standard did not determine the result. Schauer
could then argue that most of the litigated disputes will come from this third set.
34. It is difficult to see why the same incentive structure that screens out legally determinate
cases would not operate to screen out extra-legally determinate cases once lay judges begin deciding
cases on the basis of moral or political or economic criteria. Schauer argues that legal expertise is
not required in cases which are legally indeterminate. The same argument would seem to hold for
lay judges in cases that are extra-legally indeterminate. Indeed, Schauer's argument seems to lead to
the reductio ad absurdum that there can be no criteria actually applied in the decision of appellate
cases as any possible criteria if made publicly available would be used to screen out cases which are
determined by the criteria. Priest and Klein recognized this problem in a slightly different context.
See Priest & Klein, supra note 32, at 51 (discussing problem of "experimental circularity").
35. I believe that the Priest and Klein model of the appellate process suffers from a number of
technical flaws even in the context of civil litigation between business enterprises-the context in
which the assumption that the litigants' motivations are adequately modeled by a profit maximiza-
tion assumption has the greatest appeal. First, it assumes that there are no strategic incentives to
appeal. There are, however, many such incentives. For example, there is an incentive to delay if the
statutory rate of interest is less than the effective rate of return for a defendant with a monetary
judgment against it. Ifa plaintiff's effective rate of return is lower than the statutory rate of interest,
there will be no efficient settlement, even assuming that both parties estimate the probability of
success on appeal at zero. Another strategic incentive may stem from bargaining tactics. For exam-
ple, an early interlocutory appeal might be taken to create the perception of tough bargaining.
Second, the model assumes that certain risk preference structures will not occur. Where the
loser in a lower court has a preference for risks, the winner is risk averse and the parties estimate
there is a positive chance of success on appeal, there may be no efficient settlement.
Third, the model assumes that the parties' estimates of success are unbiased and on the average
equal to the true likelihood. Id. at 14. This assumption would be incorrect if the common observa-
tion that some litigators systematically overestimate their chances of success is correct. Moreover,
some clients may be unduly optimistic because of their belief that they are in the right.
36. Id. at 4.
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"public interest" litigation may have ideological motivations. Those who
make the decision to appeal may have a strong preference to make their
arguments, even if they do not believe the arguments will succeed. Like-
wise, attorneys for government agencies which are not directly subject to
market pressures may wish to litigate only when they have an extremely
high probability of victory; they may believe that promotions or other
rewards will be tied to their victory rates. On the other hand, the polit-
ical system may reward the decision to advocate a politically popular
position which has a low probability of legal success. Individuals also
have ideological motivations; an example is the tax protest movement.
In addition, it may not be possible to structure a settlement that
compensates the appellant for the expected utility of an appeal that has a
positive but small probability of success. For example, in criminal cases
there may be incentives for losing defendants to appeal even when the
chances of success are low. The value of freedom from incarceration
may be high enough to justify an appeal even when discounted by a small
chance of success on appeal. The prosecution is not likely to be able or
willing to bargain with the defendant for a reduction in sentence in
exchange for the plaintiff's abandonment of an appeal that is unlikely to
succeed. Jailhouse lawyers may actually prefer work on successive
appeals and habeas petitions to the other pursuits available in prison.
Finally, there may be an asymmetry of stakes in appellate litigation
which makes it impossible to reach an efficient settlement. The Priest
and Klein model assumed that there was symmetry of stakes, i.e. that the
plaintiff had as much, ahd only as much, to gain as the defendant had to
lose. 7 On appeal, however, this symmetry may not exist. For example,
one side may have an interest in setting a precedent that will yield bene-
fits in future disputes but the other side may have a stake only in the
dispute on appeal. In such circumstances, Priest and Klein predicted
that the victory rate for plaintiffs on appeal would not approach 50
percent.3 8
37. Id. at 5.
38. One would expect that in appellate disputes generally, for which the objectives of the
parties most frequently are some favorable precedent, the stakes are likely to differ system-
atically. As a consequence, although our model of settlement and litigation applies indis-
tinguishably to trial and appellate disputes, we would expect the rate of appellate success
to differ systematically from 50 percent.
Id. at 28-29 (footnotes omitted).
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In sum, it is very difficult to argue that rational choice theory
predicts that appellate decisions will be legally indeterminate when real-
istic assumptions about motivations and options is incorporated into a
model of the choice situation.
b. Decision of easy cases requires judicial intelligence: All of these
theoretical considerations coircide with the empirical evidence. There
are many appeals in which the law is relatively determinate. This is the
first reason for my contention that appellate judges must possess knowl-
edge of the law and skill in legal reasoning. At all levels of the appellate
process, judges confront cases in which decision requires an intellectual
virtue that is distinctly legal. Appellate judges must read and understand
statutes, regulations, and cases. They are required to identify the legally
significant aspects of a factual situation and apply the law to those facts.
Of course, none of this comes as a surprise. Anyone who has partic-
ipated in the appellate process knows that judges do these things.
Although an advocate of lay judging may disagree with the number of
cases in which these skills are required, the occasional easy case must be
acknowledged and some means to deal with it must be provided.
Schauer, for example, argues that the easy cases can be separated from
the normal appellate process and handled by legal technicians who
would screen the cases and decide them by virtue of a summary proce-
dure. The Ninth Circuit has adopted some aspects of Schauer's proposal.
Staff Attorneys screen out easy cases and write memoranda and proposed
opinions; judges then decide these cases without oral argument and fre-
quently the court will adopt the recommendations of the staff attorneys
without modification. A similar premise may offer support to arguments
in favor of the creation of a National Court of Appeals or an Intercircuit
Court to handle the more routine appeals directed at the Supreme Court.
The new court could be staffed by legal technicians, while politicians or
philosophers appointed to a Supreme Court would be freed from the
mundane chores of legal reasoning.
Even if there are more easy cases than an advocate of lay appellate
judging admits, these sorting mechanisms may suffice to preserve a role
for lay judges in the decision of the hard cases. The next section of this
essay argues against that conclusion. I will accept the premise that
appellate courts (as presently constituted or as they would be constituted
after a screening mechanism had been instituted) will decide only hard
cases. This premise does not lead to the conclusion that lay persons
should be selected as appellate judges.
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2. The Resolution of Hard Cases Requires Judicial Intelligence
There is an obvious reason why a large but limited category of hard
cases requires specifically legal intellectual skills. I will discuss this cate-
gory briefly and then consider two very general reasons behind the diffi-
culty that nonlawyers would experience in resolving appeals.
a. Some hard cases involve issues that are conceptually legal: Many
appeals which are legally indeterminate are nevertheless resolvable only
by specifically legal considerations because the issue being appealed can-
not even be conceptualized without a detailed knowledge of the legal pro-
cess. Procedural issues are obvious examples. Consider appeals that
pose questions about pleading under the simplified procedures in the
Federal Rules. For example, how would a lay person decide the issue of
what constitutes sufficient particularity in the pleading of fraud under
Rule 9(b)? Think about a lay person deciding a hard case concerning the
applicability of statutory interpleader to an insurance dispute. Imagine a
lay judge attempting to resolve an appeal where there were conflicting
precedents about the impact of the Erie doctrine on Rule 19 in a diversity
case that has been removed from a state court system permitting Doe
pleading. Even cases that pose important social policy questions may be
so intertwined with legal technicalities that lay judging would be difficult.
The eleventh amendment, for example, has important implications for
civil rights actions, but the impact of changes in doctrine in this area of
the law is difficult even for lawyers to understand. Standing issues may
pose similar problems for lay judges.
Even if these "legal" hard cases are indeterminate, the considera-
tions of policy or value or politics which must inform their resolution do
require judicial intelligence. This may not pose a fatal problem for the
advocate of lay judging. Again, mechanisms could be adopted for
screening out the hard cases involving legal technicalities. A special
court of legal technicians could hear the "legal" hard cases. This solu-
tion is, however, problematic. A large number of the social policy cases
may also present "legal" issues on appeal. The court of legal technicians
might actually adopt a deliberate strategy of creating legal technicalities
in order to retain jurisdiction, and hence power, over as many of these
disputes as possible. The advocate of lay judging owes a great deal of
explanation about how such a proposal would work.
b. Outcomes are constrained by law in all hard cases: Assuming
such an explanation is forthcoming, there is a related and more pervasive
reason why the adjudication of hard cases requires the virtue of judicial
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intelligence. Schauer contends that in appellate cases in which there is
an outcome-determinative issue which is not itself determined by the
existing positive law, the decision will require a choice that can be made
on moral, political, or economic grounds. This contention assumes a
simplified model of the output of an appellate court as a pure decision: to
affirm or reverse the lower court. When the actual output is viewed it
becomes apparent that legal factors do constrain appellate decisionmak-
ing, even in hard cases.
In order to discuss this point, I need to develop some conceptual
apparatus. Thus far, I have accepted the implicit assumption that inde-
terminacy and determinacy are exhaustive categories; in other words, the
decision of an appeal is either determined by the law or it is indetermi-
nate. In fact, this is not the case. A legal dispute may be constrained by
the positive law, but not determined by it. Thus, I add to determinacy
and indeterminacy a third category: underdeterminacy.
Roughly, an appeal is underdetermined by the law if the outcome
including the formal mandate and the content of the opinion, can vary
within limits that are defined by the legal materials.39 The notion of a
"hard case" can now be explicated with reference to the category. An
appeal is a hard case if (but not "if and only if" as I will argue below4 )
the outcome is underdetermined in a way that an appellate judge must
choose from among legally acceptable outcomes that constitute victory
for different parties to the appeal. The point is that the outcome of an
appeal need not be completely indeterminate in order for the case to be a
hard case; an appeal in which the results are underdetermined by the law
will be "hard" if the legally acceptable variation creates the difference
between loss or victory for the litigants.41
A moment's reflection on the nature of appellate cases will confirm
that even the "hardest" appellate case is likely to be underdetermined by
39. This approximation can be made more precise by considering the relationship between two
sets of outcomes for a given appeal. The first set consists of all imaginable results-all the imagina-
ble variations in the mandate (affirmance, reversal, remand, etc.) and in the reasoning of the opinion.
The distinctions between determinacy, indeterminacy, and underdeterminacy of the law with respect
to a given appellate case may be marked with the following definitions:
The law is determinate with respect to a given appeal if and only if the set of results that
can be squared with the positive law contains one and only one member.
The law is underdeterminate with respect to a given appeal if and only if the set of results
that can be squared with the positive law is a nonidentical subset of all imaginable results.
The law is indeterminate with respect to a given appeal if the set of results that can be
squared with the positive law is identical with the set of all imaginable results.
These distinction are discussed in greater detail in Solum, supra note 27, at 472-74.
40. See infra pp. 1750-51.
41. See Solum, supra note 27, at 473-74.
1748
VIRTUES AND VICES
the law and not completely indeterminate. Many appellate dispositions
require more than a simple decision to affirm or reverse; for example the
decision whether or not to remand may well be constrained by the law.
Perhaps even more pervasive are legal constraints on the grounds
chosen for a decision. In our system, the rule of stare decisis makes the
reasoning of an opinion an authoritative legal text that will have influ-
ence on future opinions. Although American judges typically do not
attempt to formulate a single proposition as the authoritative holding,
there can be no question that the reasoning of a case has a substantial
effect on its future legal effect. Appellate judges must choose the grounds
for their decision as well as a result in the narrow sense, and the choice of
grounds will almost always be constrained by the positive law, even if the
result itself is not. Is the contract invalid because the offer was not val-
idly accepted, or because there was no consideration, or because it was
contrary to public policy? The answer to such questions will invariably
be constrained by the law. This notion of constraint that does not deter-
mine outcome suggests a third reason that decision of hard cases requires
judicial intelligence.
Thus, the virtue of judicial intelligence will be required even in hard
cases which do not involve technical legal issues because appellate judges
are required to write opinions which explain the grounds for their deci-
sions. Furthermore, in the writing of such opinions these judges must
make choices that are constrained by the law. The reasons provided in
the particular case being decided must be consistent with the law at large,
not only with the statutes, constitutions, and regulations, but also with
reasons and justifications provided in other cases. It would be difficult
for lay appellate judges to write good opinions, even if they had an excel-
lent grasp of the moral or political reasons that grounded their
preferences.
c. The synthesis of legal and nonlegal grounds for decision requires
judicial intelligence: There is an additional related reason that decisions
in hard cases require judicial intelligence. Schauer argues that resolution
of hard cases will require consideration of factors that are not legal in the
narrow sense. Indeed, he suggests that a broad range of moral, political,
economic, or cultural factors might be included. This suggestion poses
the question of how these diverse factors are to be integrated with each
other within the law. A partial answer lies in the particular skill of syn-
thesizing the nonlegal with the legal that is part of judicial intelligence.
In other words, lawyers are generalists. They are trained to apply con-
siderations of policy, morality, economics, and culture to legal problems.
1988] 1749
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1735
For all these reasons, a good appellate judge must possess the virtue
of judicial intelligence in order to do a good job of resolving hard cases in
which the law does not determine the result.
3. Hardness Sometimes Results from Complexity Rather
Than Indeterminacy
There is another and perhaps especially important reason that
appellate judges should possess the intellectual virtue that I have called
judicial intelligence. Not every case of perceived indeterminacy results
from actual indeterminacy of the legal materials. In at least some cases
in which there is a "legally correct outcome," the reasons for this out-
come will be sufficiently complex that some litigators simply will be
unable to understand the law. I want to make a disclaimer about the
frequency of such cases. Law professors may well overestimate the fre-
quency of cases in which deep study and understanding of the law will
enable a judge to recognize that a result is compelled by a complex but
nevertheless determinate application of the existing law. Given this
caveat, however, I believe that it is indisputable that such cases exist.
The nature of these cases might be clarified by an analogy with
another practical discipline: engineering. A particularly difficult prob-
lem in engineering-the design of a bridge over a long and unusually
windy gorge-may be "hard" in the same two senses that an appellate
case may be "hard." Some engineering problems allow several equally
good solutions that are permitted by the various laws or rules of thumb
that engineers derive from material science. In such cases, the engineer
may choose from among the possible solutions on the basis of some
nonengineering criterion such as aesthetic value. On the other hand,
some engineering problems are hard because they are very complex. The
best solution is not easy to derive. In such cases, there may be disagree-
ment among practicing engineers about which solution is the best (or
only) solution, but the mere fact of disagreement does not entail that no
solution is in fact best. The more brilliant or more experienced engineer
may be able to discover a solution which his or her more mundane col-
leagues cannot.
What are the implications of the existence of "hard cases" that are
"hard complex" rather than "hard indeterminate" for the selection of
appellate judges? I believe that one of our hopes is that appellate judges
will be able to provide the right answers in very complex cases. Of
course, this does not always happen. Appellate judges are not always
selected for judicial intelligence, and we are all familiar with appellate
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decisions where the court got it wrong because the judges did not under-
stand a complicated legal issue. My point is a modest one: other things
being equal, we have a very good reason to select judges who possess the
intellectual virtue of judicial intelligence-Sir Edward Coke's "artificial
reason of the law."
So far, I have established the proposition that appellate judges ought
to possess the virtue of judicial intelligence-a substantial obstacle in the
path of an advocate of lay appellate judging. Still, it might be suggested
that lay appellate judges could be given a "crash course" that would
enable them to gain an intellectual grasp of the law. More importantly,
judicial intelligence can be used for good or ill. A very intelligent unprin-
cipled judge could use legal reasoning skills to provide clever but sophis-
tic demonstrations that a personal preference is required by the law; a
nihilist judge could use judicial intelligence to create indeterminacy
where stability could be found. In part because of these possibilities, the
intellectual virtue of judicial intelligence is necessary but not sufficient for
good appellate judging. I will now consider a second, specifically moral
virtue: judicial integrity.
B. JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
A good judge should have a special fidelity to the law and its coher-
ence. I call the judicial character trait that expresses this fidelity judicial
integrity. Judicial integrity is what Aristotle would call a moral virtue:
it is an aspect of character that creates a disposition to choose in a certain
way.
Why should appellate judges possess judicial integrity? Why should
appeals be decided by persons whose choosing is disposed towards fidel-
ity to the law and its coherence? The basic answer is expressed in the
ideal of the rule of law. The rule of law is a complex notion with a long
history;42 my exploration begins with the publicity requirement-the
principle that the content of the law should be known or knowable by
those who must live with its consequences.
One of the virtues of judging is suppressing one's political or moral
preferences and deciding on the basis of the law. If all appeals were
decided on the basis of politics or morality, the grounds for appellate
decisions might well become more comprehensible, but the law, in the
42. See generally L. FULLER, THE MoRALrry OF LAW 33-94 (1964); J. RAwLs, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 235-42 (1971).
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end, would become less certain.43 The decisional law would truly shift
with the political winds and as a result become less public. Less concern
with fidelity to the law in appellate judging would threaten a second
aspect of the rule of law: fairness demands that like cases be treated
alike. Both aspects of the rule of law support the conclusion that appel-
late judges should have a special fidelity to the law.
There is a second and more controversial reason to value judicial
integrity that derives from the principle that like cases should be treated
alike. It is at least arguable that appellate decisions in what seem like
distinct doctrinal areas may be strongly interconnected at the level of
justification. This phenomenon is expressed in the maxim that the law is
a seamless web. In a sense, however, these interconnections results from
the choices of appellate adjudicators. Judges can try to shape the law so
that it reflects, so far as possible, consistent conceptions of morality or
politics, or they can treat each area of the law as an opportunity for
expression of their own values, regardless of the consistency of such val-
ues with the values expressed in prior decisions. The hope that judges
will strive for consistency is reflected in the postulate that the law works
itself pure. If we believe that fairness requires consistency in the law as a
whole, then we should value the concern for such coherence that is
expressed in the virtue of judicial integrity.
C. JUDICIAL WISDOM
The final virtue I call judicial wisdom. I mean to refer to the partic-
ularly judicial variety of the virtue which Aristotle termed phronesis-the
virtue of practical wisdom.' Practical wisdom is the virtue that enables
one to make good choices in particular circumstances. The person of
practical wisdom knows which particular ends are worth pursuing and
which means best achieve those ends. Judicial wisdom is simply the vir-
tue of practical wisdom applied to the choices which judges must make.
43. At first blush, it might appear that concern for the law and all its technicalities is unlikely
to advance the cause of publicity. Lay judges, it might be argued, would actually improve the pub-
licity of law by dispensing with the arcane technicalities of law and resolving particular disputes with
reference to publicly available notions of morality. This argument confuses the simplicity of the
grounds for choice with certainty of outcome. For a classic exposition of the benefits of positive law,
see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-96 (1961).
44. My account ofphronesis derives from the work of W.F.R. Hardie, Troels Engberg-Pcder-
sen, and Alasdair McIntyre. See A. MACINrYRE, supra note 14, at 154; W. HARDIE, supra note 15,
at 212-39; T. ENGBERG-PEDERSEN, ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF MORAL INSIGHT (1983). 1 have also
profited from Anthony Kronman's essay on the relationship between practical wisdom and profes-
sional character. See Kronman, Practical Wisdom and Professional Character in PHILOSOPHY AND
LAW (1987).
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The practically wise judge has developed excellence in knowing what
goals to pursue in the particular case and excellence in choosing the
means to accomplish those goals.
I will begin to make this abstract account of judicial wisdom more
concrete by considering the contrast between practical wisdom and theo-
retical wisdom in the judicial context. The judge who possesses theoreti-
cal wisdom is the master of legal theory with the ability to engage in
sophisticated legal reasoning and insight into subtle connections in legal
doctrine. Such a judge, for example, would be able to penetrate the mys-
teries of the eleventh amendment or the Rule Against Perpetuities. I
want to suggest that a judge who possesses judicial intelligence and judi-
cial integrity is still not necessarily a good judge. Even a brilliant judge,
dedicated to the law, could be a disaster in the decision of particular
cases if lacking in the ability to appreciate what was truly important in
the particular case and to devise the means to achieve those ends. Such a
judge might fashion a rule that is theoretically sound but poses intracta-
ble problems when actually applied. For example, a theoretically sound
burden of persuasion may be a practical disaster if it is too expensive for
parties to develop admissible evidence which meets the burden.
The judge who possesses practical wisdom in addition to theoretical
wisdom has a different set of abilities. We might say such a judge has
common sense. Such a judge knows whether a particular doctrinal for-
mulation will work in practice and can grasp which aspect of the law is
most important in a particular situation. The wise judge not only under-
stands the mysteries of the eleventh amendment, but can apply the elev-
enth amendment to particular case in a just fashion. The wise judge
knows how real lawyers and parties will react to appellate decisions.
Our understanding of the role of judicial wisdom in good judging
can be sharpened by considering its connection with Aristotle's concept
of equity. The law, according to Aristotle, is defective because of its gen-
erality. No general rule can guarantee the best outcome in all particular
situations. Equity allows the judge to dispense with the general rule in
the particular case and reach a just result.45 In modem legal parlance,
we refer the same idea as informed judicial discretion or equitable discre-
tion. In order to do equity and depart from the general rule when the
circumstances demand, the judge must possess practical wisdom.
45. EN, supra note 17, 1137 a32-1138 a2.
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Consider in contrast the accounts of judicial discretion by Schauer
and Dworkin. Schauer would have us believe that in the zone of discre-
tion results are not determined by law and thus must be determined by
something else entirely. For Schauer, law operates only in the core and it
is politics, morality, or economics that rules the penumbra. Schauer
believes that judicial intelligence does not determine the results in hard
cases, and therefore legal expertise is simply not relevant to their resolu-
tion. For Dworkin, even the penumbra is part of law's empire. Dworkin
believes that if the legal rules narrowly conceived do not determine the
results in particular cases, then the judge must develop a theory that
yields principles which will do the job of determination.4 6 We might say
that Dworkin believes that the law is entirely a matter of judicial
intelligence.
In a sense, Dworkin and Schauer are making the same mistake
because they both are assuming that legal knowledge is all a matter of
theoretical wisdom. For Dworkin, appellate decisionmaking is a matter
of theoretical wisdom about the principles that underlie the law. For
Schauer, appellate decisionmaking is a matter of theoretical wisdom
about politics, economics or culture. I want to suggest that, at least in
some cases of discretion, Aristotle's conceptions of equity and practical
wisdom provide a more fruitful explanation of how decisions are and
should be made. An equitable decision is not determined by the rules or
by any set of principles derived from a grand theory of the law, nor is it
determined by some larger theory of morality or economics; rather,
equity is a disciplined judgment about a particular case that is informed
by an ability to select ends and means in particular cases-an ability that
has been developed by experience in the practice or praxis of law.
In sum, a good judge must possess the judicial virtues: judicial intel-
ligence, judicial integrity, and judicial wisdom. No formula that specifies
the correct decision procedure for the resolution of appeals will guaran-
tee good judging unless the judge possesses these virtues. Moreover,
these virtues cannot be obtained through a sheer act of will; the best way
for a judge to develop the judicial virtues is by practicing law. This claim
is my final topic.
46. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 11, at 264.
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III. THE JUDICIAL VIRTUES ARE DEVELOPED THROUGH
PARTICIPATION IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Aristotle believed that the intellectual virtues were inculcated
through training and experience and that the moral virtues were devel-
oped by habit. His view provides insight into the question of the judicial
virtues as well. In order to acquire judicial intelligence, integrity, and
wisdom, judges must be trained in the law, experience legal practice, and
develop the habit of respect and concern for the law. For this reason, the
best judges are likely to have experience as practicing lawyers, and the
very best judges reach their full potential for judicial excellence only after
they have spent some time on the bench. This conclusion is supported by
consideration of each of the three judicial virtues.
Judicial intelligence is developed through legal training and experi-
ence. One acquires the ability to engage in legal reasoning by studying
law; one develops excellence in legal reasoning through attendance at law
school and by practicing law. In other legal systems, judges are civil
servants who are recruited directly from law school; these judges may
hone their legal reasoning skills on a lower court before promotion to
more important judgeships. Lay people, however, are not likely to pos-
sess excellence in legal reasoning.
Similarly, judicial integrity is fostered by habit. Aristotle thought
that a moral virtue such as courage was acquired by engaging in coura-
geous actions; acting courageously enables one to become a courageous
person. Likewise, the attitudes of respect and concern for the law are
fostered by acting with respect and concern for the law. Such actions are
required of legal practitioners, and it is through participation in the prac-
tice of law or judging that one begins to develop judicial integrity. Lay
people are unlikely to have developed the virtue of judicial integrity
because they will not have had the experiences that enable one to respect
the value of the law and care for its coherence.
Finally, it is quite clear that judicial wisdom can only be acquired
through experience as a lawyer or judge. Legal practice allows the
potential judge to develop a sense for what does and does not work as a
practical matter. Legal practice exposes the potential judge to the people
who are affected by the law and enables the potential judge to develop a
sense of when the law is achieving something that is really worthwhile.
Even if a nonlawyer could develop a sophisticated theoretical under-
standing of and real respect for the law, the lay judge will not possess the
ability wisely to choose ends and means in particular situations.
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If we return at last to our discomfort with Schauer's provocative
suggestion that nonlawyers could be good appellate judges, we can see
that there are many good reasons for our intuitions. Even if many appel-
late cases are hard cases, in which nonlegal factors such as morality, poli-
tics, or economics must play a role, it does not follow that nonlawyers
could do a good job of making the decisions. Moreover, my analysis of
judicial virtue, which revealed the difficulties with lay judging, has
broader implications for judicial selection. The reasons for favoring the
selection of lawyers over lay people as judges are also reasons for favor-
ing the selection of excellent lawyers over mediocre ones, and for the
selection of experienced lawyers over novices. In the end there are some
very good reasons to favor merit selection of judges. That is not to say
that we should not also consider whether the candidate believes in a par-
ticular procedure for appellate decisionmaking, nor is it a reason to reject
consideration of a judge's political or moral views; many theories of judi-
cial decisionmaking require judges who are adept at moral reasoning,
economic theory, or political judgment. It is to say that even in the spe-
cial corner of the law that is appellate adjudication we ought to select
judges who are adept at legal reasoning, who have concern for the integ-
rity of law, and who possess the experience to make sound practical judg-
ments. First and foremost, judicial selection should be a matter of virtue
and vice.
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